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INNOVATIVE VIEWPOINT
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Abstract. The difficulties in tackling climate change are inherently complex and primarily centered on
political and social values. This is evident in the United States where political divisions and polarizations
are fundamental barriers to advancing national policies, which in turn hinder international agreements,
mitigation, and adaptation. Within the United States, the vast majority of agricultural and natural resource
lands are projected to incur significant climate departures and are represented by the Republican Party. The
resources and economic sectors that will be directly affected by climate change are represented by national
leadership that is unlikely to accept policies to prevent or adapt to change. Given the large impact of
climate change on ecosystem services, the predominance of political polarizations raises serious concerns
about the ability to enhance the resilience of the nation’s agricultural and natural resource lands in the face
of future change.
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THE POLARIZATION PROBLEM
In September 2013 scientists approved the
Summary for Policymakers of Working Group
I’s contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
It reiterates what has been said before, stating
that ‘‘warming of the climate system is unequiv-
ocal’’ and ‘‘it is extremely likely that human
influence has been the dominant cause of the
observed warming since the mid-20th century’’
(IPCC 2013). While the summary provides
‘‘comprehensive analysis of policy options and
the scientific basis for the next round of climate
negotiations’’ it has been criticized as lacking
‘‘political ambition’’ and has been suggested that
‘‘scientists should focus on smaller and more
rapid assessments of more pressing questions
that have a particular political interest’’ (Nature
Editorial 2013).
In the United States of America climate change
is no longer a scientific issue, but a socio-political
one that is now largely dominated by political
divisions, primarily along party lines (McCright
and Dunlap 2011, Fisher et al. 2013, Guber 2013).
While environmental issues have historically
been split between parties—particularly among
the political elite within the U.S. Congress—party
affiliation has not been considered a significant
variable for explaining environmental concern
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among the general public (Dunlap et al. 2001,
Guber 2013). This changed during the 1990s as
citizens began to follow the political elite and
Republican leaders attacked the scientific basis of
climate change (Krosnick et al. 2000, McCright
and Dunlap 2011). Presently, the divide between
the two parties has become even greater as a
recent opinion poll indicates that 50% of Repub-
lican voters consider there to be no solid evidence
of global warming and climate change compared
to 10% of Democratic voters (Pew 2013). Previous
polls have shown similar trends (e.g., Dunlap
and McCright 2008).
Although recognition of this political divide
within the United States is not new, it is a
fundamental barrier for national policy and
action, as well as international standards, miti-
gation, and adaptation. As a top contributor of
global emissions, the United States is viewed as a
potential leader in climate change adaptation and
its actions influence policies worldwide (Nord-
haus 2001). The nation, however, lags behind
other governments in developing a national
climate action plan—a negligence that ultimately
hinders international agreements (Nordhaus
2001, McCright and Dunlap 2003). Instead, the
United States has relied on diverse local and state
mandates with the objective of meeting specific
outcomes and targets (e.g., emission standards,
fuel efficiency, etc.; Lutsey and Sperling 2008,
Rosenzweig et al. 2010). While the intent of these
regulations is in line with recommendations from
the international scientific community, imposing
new regulations on the general public has been
used by the Republican Party as a platform to
further frame and manipulate the scientific
consensus about climate change (Levendusky
2010), leading to further political distrust and
polarization (Fisher et al. 2013, Leiserowitz et al.
2013).
THE GEO-POLITICAL INTERACTION
To further confound the issue, the representa-
tion of land area within the United States is not
equally distributed across political parties. Re-
publican congressional districts presently repre-
sent 397% greater land area than Democratic
districts. Furthermore, Republican districts rep-
resent 450% and 300% greater agricultural and
natural resource lands, respectively (contermi-
nous United States only). When climate change
projections are combined with political represen-
tation and land cover, a significant concern
arises. Based on an ensemble climate model,
some of the nation’s most important agricultural
and natural resources occur in congressional
districts and regions projected for significant
climate departures by the end of century (Fig.
1; see also Appendix).
The 10 congressional districts with the most
agricultural and natural resource lands all have
significant temperature departures (greater than
48C or 7.28F) and are predominantly represented
by the Republican Party (Table 1). Long-held
Republican districts in the Midwest and Great
Plains, which produce the bulk of the U.S. cash
crops, are projected to have the highest temper-
ature departures in the nation (Fig. 1a). Unlike
crops that do well at warmer temperatures, the
primary grain crops from these regions—corn,
wheat, and soybean—are expected to decrease
with even modest temperature departures (Hat-
field et al. 2008). Republican-dominated districts
within the southern Great Plains, which produce
the most cattle and cattle income in the United
States (National Agricultural Statistics Service
2012), not only experience severe warming but
also some of the most significant precipitation
decreases (Fig. 1b). This combination can have
devastating effects on livestock and ranching
productivity. In the state of Texas alone, agricul-
tural losses during the drought of 2011 were
estimated to exceed $5.2 billion, with half
attributed to losses in livestock production
(Agrilife Today 2011). In the slightly Republi-
can-favored Southwest, increasing temperatures
and drought are expected to worsen the already
catastrophic losses of forest resources to insects,
disease, and wildfire. Already, over one million
hectares of forest die-off in the Southwest have
been attributed to warming temperatures and
increasing drought severity (Allen et al. 2010).
This leads to a significant concern regarding
the political polarization of climate change:
climate projections predict that lands represented
by the Republican Party, which frequently
opposes a national climate change policy, are
more likely to experience the greatest impacts of
climate change. Overall, Republican districts
represent more land in the highest projected
temperature category (greater than 48C or 7.28F)
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Fig. 1. The geographic interaction of political representation, land cover, and projected temperature and
precipitation changes within the conterminous United States. The 113th U.S. congressional districts by party
affiliation and (a) projected mean annual temperature increase and (b) projected annual precipitation decrease.
The Republican Party represents a large land base and specific congressional districts and geographical regions
(e.g., the Midwest, Great Plains, Southwest) are projected to have significant departures. Note that darker colors
(both blue and red) represent greater temperature increases and precipitation decreases. All projections used an
ensemble, high emissions (A2), end of century scenario; see Appendix for results from additional models.
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than in all Democratic districts combined, re-
gardless of their increase (Fig. 2a). Republican
districts also represent more land with greater
projected decreases in precipitation than Demo-
cratic districts (Fig. 2b). The apparent disconnect
between climate vulnerability and the current
political rhetoric is worrisome, as these lands and
the economic sectors within them—agriculture
and natural resources—are strongly linked to
climate, tying the realities of climate change to
the livelihoods of many constituents. Further-
more, national and global food securities are at
risk. In 2012, U.S. agricultural products were
valued at $444.3 billion (USD), with $141.2 billion
in exports of primarily soybean, corn, and
unmilled wheat (USDA ERS 2013). Finding
solutions to adapt to the difficulties caused by
climate change will not only sustain these
Fig. 2. Area of land cover categories within the conterminous United States separated by party representation,
(a) projected temperature increase, and (b) projected precipitation decrease. The Republican Party represents the
vast majority of agricultural and natural resources lands and many of these lands have significant climate
departures. Note that darker colors (both blue and red) represent greater temperature increases and precipitation
decreases. All projections used an ensemble, high emissions (A2), end of century scenario; see Appendix for
results from additional models.
Table 1. Five congressional districts with the most agricultural and natural resource land area and their projected
climate departures.
Congressional district Representation Size (million ha)
Temperature
increase (8C (8F))
Precipitation
change (%)
Agriculture
North Dakota 01 Republican 10.12 4.5 (8.1) 13
South Dakota 01 Republican 7.27 4.5 (8.1) 10
Kansas 01 Republican 7.16 4.7 (8.4) 3
Montana 01 Republican 6.11 4.2 (7.5) 8
Minnesota 07 Democratic 5.77 4.6 (8.2) 13
Natural Resource
Montana 01 Republican 30.91 4.2 (7.5) 8
Wyoming 01 Republican 23.96 4.5 (8.1) 3
New Mexico 02 Republican 17.89 4.6 (8.2) 8
Oregon 02 Republican 16.20 4.0 (7.2) 3
Texas 23 Democratic 14.25 4.4 (7.9) 8
 Ensemble average projection, high emissions scenario (A2), end of century.
v www.esajournals.org 4 December 2014 v Volume 5(12) v Article 159
INNOVATIVE VIEWPOINT ALLRED ET AL.
important economic sectors, but may also active-
ly engage the political parties and constituencies
that will be most affected in those regions.
THE DIFFICULTY MOVING FORWARD
This interaction of climate change, land cover,
and political representation highlights that the
regions and economic sectors predicted to be the
most affected by climate change have political
leadership that is presently more likely to resist
policies to mitigate or adapt. While the conse-
quences of not acting have been reported
repeatedly by natural scientists, the political
divide still exists. Why? It is clear that this
divide, as well as any potential solution to bridge
it, is rooted in the cultural, political, and social
values found on both sides.
Numerous explanations have been put for-
ward to explain the polarization, including: the
role of media, political organization of industry
interests, psychological responses to existential
threats, and social organizations of belief systems
(list from Moser and Berzonsky 2014). Guber
(2013) suggests that polarization over climate
change is due to party sorting that occurs as
‘‘people acquire information and become familiar
with elite cues.’’ Furthermore, it is when elites
disagree that ‘‘polarization occurs, and citizens
rely on other indicators, such as political party or
source credibility, to make up their minds’’
(McDonald 2009, Brulle et al. 2012). Because of
this, initiatives that focus on increased awareness
or information are unlikely to succeed (Guber
2013). Outreach efforts that aim to generate
concern and advance policy by providing scien-
tific information can ultimately be ineffective or
even lead to increased opposition (e.g., Lee 2012,
North Carolina General Assembly 2012). Many
efforts have also attempted both general and
formal education to advance political action, but
that too may be ineffective. While concern for
climate change increases with education and
knowledge for Democratic Party members, it in
fact decreases with education among those of the
Republican Party (Malka et al. 2009, Hamilton
2011). Furthermore, some states with majority
Republican representation have introduced leg-
islation to restrict the teaching of climate change
in public classrooms (Kansas Legislature 2013,
Oklahoma Legislature 2013).
As climate change is viewed as a socio-political
issue, there are always requests for transdisci-
plinary and transformative approaches that build
upon the interdisciplinary infrastructure of aca-
demic institutions to find solutions for climate
mitigation and adaptation, as well as for advanc-
ing policy. One common call is for greater
integration of the social and natural sciences as
an essential step toward bridging the political
divide and advancing policy, as well as the entire
challenge of global environmental change (ISSC
2011). Unfortunately, this integration is often in
the form of social scientists being asked to help
solve problems, as well as evaluate and promote
solutions, outlined by the natural scientists
towards the end of a project (Fox et al. 2006).
This approach has ‘‘not served society well,’’
resulting in the need for ‘‘a deeper, more
meaningful and constructive form of collabora-
tion’’ between social and natural scientists
(Hackmann and Clair 2012).
The traditional research–outreach model sur-
rounding agriculture and natural resources also
faces similar challenges for disseminating scien-
tific information on climate change. This has
historically focused on research carried out by
land-grant universities and dissemination pro-
vided by the cooperative extension service. Yet
individuals within these institutions often en-
counter difficulty addressing and communicating
climate change due to their own attitudes and
perceptions or the local political atmosphere
(Monroe et al. 2014). There are also concerns of
a mismatch between the relative importance of
climate change in academic research compared to
the dissemination of those research findings in
strategic outreach programs. For example, while
land-grant universities outline climate change as
a priority for research, many of the same
universities do not include climate change as
part of their strategic plans in state or national
outreach programs (e.g., APLU 2010a, 2010b) and
many do not provide any outreach materials
specifically extending climate change research. It
may therefore be necessary to reevaluate how
interdisciplinary research and scientific outreach
are pursued within university systems, in an
effort to more effectively address the multiple
layers of complexity surrounding the climate
change topic.
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DEEPER ENGAGEMENT, UNDERSTANDING, AND
DIALOGUE
The task of overcoming the partisan divide
surrounding climate change is complex and
challenging. Science and outreach efforts looking
for success via mass communication are unlikely
to have an impact; education opportunities can
be ineffective or restricted; interdisciplinary
research is a step in the right direction, but in
general has not been implemented appropriately
to yield effective results. So what will work? The
answer is not straightforward, and we do not
attempt to provide a one-size-fits-all solution, but
echo the calls of others: that deeper social
engagement, deeper cultural understanding,
and perhaps most importantly true dialogue—
dialogue which does not debate or tear apart, but
instead shares ideas, experiences, and concerns in
order to build relationships based on under-
standing—are all necessary to improve our
conversations about climate change and provide
real opportunities for adaptation and mitigation
(Moser and Berzonsky 2014). For those working
with agriculturalists and natural resource man-
agers (e.g., researchers, cooperative extension
agents, etc.), a deeper understanding of the
intended audience and potential insensitivities,
the willingness to change communications efforts
(e.g., terminology, conversations, etc.), and the
ability to maintain relationships of trust will be
necessary to build true dialogue and address
climate change issues. The interaction presented
here, namely that the majority of our agricultural
and natural resources lands—lands upon which
millions of people depend and from which they
benefit through provided ecosystem services—
have significant predicted climate departures and
representation that downplays climate change
and government intervention, not only adds
complexity to the polarization issue, but raises
additional concerns about the impact polariza-
tion will have on ecosystem services throughout
the United States.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
APPENDIX
Mappings of the 113th congressional districts
were downloaded from nationalatlas.gov on June
25, 2013. We updated manually the representa-
tion for the following districts: Illinois, District
02: Rep Robin Kelly, Democratic; Missouri,
District 08: Rep Jason Smith, Republican; South
Carolina, District 01: Rep Mark Sanford, Repub-
lican.
We downloaded climate models from climate-
wizard.org (Girvetz et al. 2009). We used models
that represent high emissions scenarios (A2) for
end of century (2070–2099). Downloaded data-
sets represent mean annual temperature increase
and precipitation change at a 12-km resolution
for 2070–2099 as compared to 1961–1990. We
randomly chose five models to include in the
analysis (Table A1). We also included an ensem-
ble model that is an average of all models
available from climatewizard.org. Models only
include the lower 48 states, thus excluding some
congressional districts. We spatially intersected
congressional districts with projected values and
averaged results to obtain one value per district.
Land cover characteristics were determined
from the National Land Cover Database 2006
(NLCD; Fry et al. 2011). Due to the size of the
NLCD, we reduced the resolution from 30 m to
240 m using the nearest neighbor resampling
method. We recognize the limitations of such
resampling method, but justify its use to reduce
complexity and speed up spatial analysis. We
spatially intersected the NLCD with congressio-
nal districts and climate models to determine
political representation and projected annual
temperature increase. We reclassified land cover
categories to their most general level: water,
developed, barren, natural resources, and agri-
culture (planted/cultivated). Forest, shrubland,
herbaceous, and wetlands were reclassified as
natural resources.
Table A1. List of climate models used.
Model Source
GFDL-CM2.1 US Department of Commerce/NOAA/Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory
GISS-ER NASA/Goddard Institute for Space Studies
INM-CM3.0 Institute for Numerical Mathematics
PCM National Center for Atmospheric Research
UKMO-HadCM3 Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research/Met Office
Ensemble average climatewizard.org
 Retrieved June 25, 2013 from climatewizard.org
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Fig. A1. Maps of 113th conterminous U.S. congressional districts by party affiliation and projected mean
annual temperature increase for six climate models.
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Fig. A2. Maps of 113th conterminous U.S. congressional districts by party affiliation and projected precipitation
decrease for six climate models.
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Fig. A3. Cumulative area of U.S. congressio-
nal districts from 2003–2013, separated by party
representation.
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Fig. A4. Area of land cover categories in the conterminous United States relative to temperature increase for
each climate model, separated by party representation. Climate models include HAD¼UKMO-HadCM3, PCM¼
PCM, GFDL ¼ GFDL-CM2.1, GISS ¼ GISS-ER, INM ¼ INM-CM3.0, ENS ¼ ensemble average; high emissions
scenario (A2); end of century (2070–2099).
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SUPPLEMENT
Congressional districts and climate change projections (Ecological Archives http://dx.doi.org/10.1890/
ES14-00220.1.sm).
Fig. A5. Area of land cover categories in the conterminous United States relative to precipitation decrease for
each climate model, separated by party representation. Climate models include HAD¼UKMO-HadCM3, PCM¼
PCM, GFDL ¼ GFDL-CM2.1, GISS ¼ GISS-ER, INM ¼ INM-CM3.0, ENS ¼ ensemble average; high emissions
scenario (A2); end of century (2070–2099).
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